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Frank. Verboven@econ.kuleuven.ac.be 1.  Introduction 
In  most  emerging  industries  governments  intervene  through  various  types  of regulation, 
thereby  affection the  diffusion  of new  technologies.  Because  of the drastic  technological 
changes, there is usually little consensus on  optimal policies to  be followed.  A first issue is 
whether and how entry by new finns should be regulated, and what the timing of entry should 
be.  A  second  issue  is  whether  it  is  in  the  public  interest  that  the  policy  maker sets  a 
technological  standard,  or  whether  this  decision  should  be  left  to  the  market  through 
competition among systems. Another way of  putting this question is whether standards create 
markets or markets create standards. Apart from unresolved theoretical issues, there is  little 
empirical  work  on  the  effects  of public  policy  intervention  on  the  diffusion  of new 
technologies. The aim of  this paper is to assess empirically the effects of entry regulation and 
standard-setting  on  the  evolution  of a  specific  industry,  the  worldwide  cellular  mobile 
telecommunications services industry. 
There is an extensive theoretical literature on the relationship between market structure, entry 
and the diffusion of innovation. In telecommunications, it has been argued that competition 
creates  additional incentives  to  reduce  costs,  to  innovate and to  eliminate distorted prices 
(Laffont and Tirole, 2000). While there has been some empirical work on the role of market 
structure and competition in  the diffusion of innovation, the effects of the timing of entry 
have  not  been  systematically  considered.  Important  empirical  issues  on  entry  in 
teleconununications are:  the impact of regulatory delay in issuing first entry licenses on the 
diffusion of innovation; the pre-emptive, immediate and long-tenn effects of additional entry 
licenses  on the  diffusion  of innovation;  and the  distinction  between simultaneous  versus 
sequential entry. 
The theoretical literature on technological standards versus competing systems in industries 
with network effects has grown very large and some convergence in the conclusions seems to emerge (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). A system is subject to network externalities if  consumers 
value  a  system more the more  users  adopt it.  With standards the  market  should therefore 
grow faster. For instance, standards tend to benefit consumers as they reduce their search and 
switching costs. But there is also the risk that a selected standard is not the most efficient one 
and that it  becomes difficult to  switch or develop a better one.  Moreover, there are several 
industries where different incompatible systems coexist and other cases where market forces 
push one system to take the whole market establishing itself as  the standard (e.g.  the VHS 
system for video recorders). Definite answers on market outcomes delicately depend on the 
market and technology parameters involved. Despite the extensive theoretical literature, there 
exists no empirical work that compares the effect of imposing standards on the diffusion of a 
new technology with the effect of allowing multiple systems to compete.  I 
The cellular mobile telecommunications industry offers an interesting opportunity to make a 
comparative  analysis,  since  countries  have  followed  quite  heterogeneous  and  changing 
policies both regarding entry regulation and setting standards. Our data set covers the entire 
evolution ofthe cellular mobile industry (1981-1997)2 for most countries in the worlds. There 
IS  an  increasing  empirical  IO  literature  on  the  diffusion  of  cellular  mobile 
telecommunications. Most studies have considered the cellular mobile industry in individual 
or a restricted number of countries, focusing on market conduct (Parker and Roller,  1997; 
Nattennann,  1999), or on the role of country characteristics (Dekirnpe, Parker and Sarvary 
1998). The finding that finns have market power is well established, but this has not yet been 
linked up with the diffusion literature The novelty of this paper is that it establishes a link 
between the  effects  of the  design of market  structure,  i.e.  entry  regulation  and  setting of 
standard, on competition and diffusion. 
I For an analysis of the presence of network effects, see Saloner and Shepard (1995). They do not directly 
2 Gruber and Verboven (2000) looked at the effects of competition on diffusion by looking at 
E.U countries,  emphasizing the  importance of the  capacity increase  due  to the  transition 
from the analogue to  digital technology. This paper complements these findings  in various 
respects; (l) by analyzing the  role of regulatory delay in issuing first  entry licenses on the 
speed  of diffusion  convergence  between  countries;  (2)  by  considering  the  pre-emptive, 
immediate  and  long-term  effects  from  competition  on  the  diffusion  of innovation,  and 
distinguishing between simultaneous  versus sequential entry;  (3)  by looking at  technology 
standards versus competing systems;  (4)  by extending coverage to a world-wide data set of 
140  countries  with  a  substantial  heterogeneity  in  policies  regarding  entry regulation  and 
standards. 
The paper is arranged as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief description of the most relevant 
technological aspects of cellular systems.  Section 3 describes the public policies regarding 
entry licensing and technology standards  in the various  countries.  Section 4  describes the 
econometric model.  Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results on the effects of 
entry regulation  and  standards  on the evolution of the  industry.  Section  6  concludes  and 
suggests implications for public policy. 
2.  The choice of the technological system 
Mobile  telecommunications  use  radio  waves,  instead  of wires,  to  connect  users3  The 
available  portion  of the  radio  frequencies  in  the  overall  spectrum  is  limited  both  by 
technology and regulation. The earliest applications for mobile communications date back to 
the  1920s.  Early mobile telecommunications  systems  had very limited  capacity since  they 
compare competing systems with single standards. 
2 The exception is Japan, where cellular mobile telecommunications were already introduced in 1979. 
] Fora description of each of  technological aspects see Calhoun (1988) Garg and Wilkes 
(1996) and Rappaport (1996). made use of the spectrum in a very inefficient way.  The  more efficient cellular concept of 
mobile telecommunications was developed during the 1960s. The system is  called "cellular" 
because the era to  be served is divided into cells with an antenna in the middle. This design, 
coupled  with  sophisticated  electronics,  allowed  for  more  efficient  use  of spectrum  and 
therefore  to  acco111111odate  a much larger number of users  for  a  given range of spectrum. 
Because of regulatory delays,  cellular systems were deployed only by the beginning of the 
1980s (Calhoun, 1988). 
One  may distinguish between  two  types  of cellular technologies  according to  the  way  in 
which the signals are transmitted: the analogue (or first generation) and the digital (or second 
generation)  technology  starting  at  the  beginning  of the  1990s.  The  digital  technology 
improved capacity by about 3 to  6 times over analogue technology. Digital technology has 
several additional advantages too, such as less noise in operation and enhanced privacy. 
Various systems were developed for both the analogue and digital cellular technology. They 
mainly differ in their ability to use the  spectrum efficiently.  Seven analogue systems found 
application worldwide,  compared to  four  digital  systems.  The  larger number of analogue 
systems  in the  early days  of the  cellular industry may be  explained by the  fact  that most 
countries viewed cellular telecommunications as just an additional new business of  the state-
owned telecommunications monopoly. Thus, the development of the cellular network was a 
means of honing the innovative capabilities of  national equipment suppliers. It turned out that 
the most successful systems (in terms of  the number of adopting countries) emerged when the 
domestic market was sufficiently large (e.g. analogue AMPS for the U.S.) or where there was 
a common standard across countries (analogue NMT for  Scandinavian countries  or digital 
GSM for Europe). 
4 3.  Government licensing policies 
Government licensing policy in  mobile telecommunications  has various dimensions. First, 
the government needs to decide whether to set a single national (or international) standard, or 
whether to allow multiple technological systems to compete. Second, the government has to 
decide to  how many firms  will  receive  a license.  This also  involves an important decision 
with respect to  the  timing of first  and  additional licenses.  Third,  the government needs  to 
decide how to grant licenses. In the early days  of mobile telecommunications, licenses were 
often  granted  on  a  first-come-first-serve  basis.  With  the  introduction  of  the  cellular 
technology, the first  licenses were  frequently granted automatically to the  incumbent fixed 
operators.  Additional  licenses  were  either  granted  through  an  auction,  or  through  an 
administrative tender procedure (or "beauty contest"), possibly including a license fee. 
In  our study we  focus  on the  first  and the  second dimensions  of the licensing policies:  a 
single standard versus  competing systems;  and timing of first  and additional licenses.  The 
room  for  discretionary  policy  is  limited  by the  available  spectrum  capacity  and  by  the 
technological  options.  The policy  decisions  may be  described by a  2x2  policy matrix  as 
follows.  The columns denote the number of countries that opted for a single standard or for 
multiple  competing  systems.  The  rows  denote the  number of countries that admitted  one 
monopoly operator or competing operators. This policy matrix will be used in our discussion 
of  the government licensing policies in the subsections below. 
3.1.  Multiple systems or single standards 
In markets with network externalities there are both advantages and disadvantages to having 
competing  systems.  The  presence  of  (strong)  network  externalities  typically  leads  to 
"tipping"  markets,  where  the  winning  technology  takes  the  whole  market.  Should  the government  intervene  in this  race  by imposing  a  single  standard ex ante?  Or should  the 
markets  decide  themselves  on  which  standard  will  eventually  "win"?  The  theoretical 
literature does not provide an unambiguous answer to these questions (for an overview, see 
Katz  and  Shapiro,  1994).  Advocates  of government  intervention  argue  that  imposing  a 
standard  makes  it  possible  to  realize  network  externalities  faster  and  reduces  the 
technological uncertainty among consumers. Advocates of free markets point out that system 
competition is  the  best guarantee  to  promote technological progress  and to  develop  even 
better technological  systems.  It also  reduces  the  risk  of being  locked  in  into  an  inferior 
technology promoted by the government4.  A counter argument is that free markets may also 
lead to  lock in into inferior outcomes, thereby necessitating government intervention to cope 
with this network externaliti. 
In practice, Varian and Shapiro (1988) argue that network externalities in the cellular mobile 
industry are "strong, but not overwhelming". For example, even if consumers are locked in 
into  one  system,  they  can  switch to  other systems  at  a  discount  in  exchange  for  signing 
servIce  contracts.  They conclude  that  the  market is  not  especially  prone to  tipping.  And 
indeed,  in none of the  cases where competition between systems was allowed there was a 
system that eventually cornered the market fully and became the de facto  standard (e.g. the 
u.S. digital cellular market still supports three systems). 
What  is  the  relative  importance  of competing  systems  versus  standards  for  cellular 
telecommunications?  Table  I  shows  that  of the  118  countries  that  adopted  an analogue 
cellular system,  105  opted for  a single  standard,  and  13  for  competing standards.  A  quite 
similar picture obtains for the countries that adopted a digital system. Of the 87 countries, 79 
4 An  example is high definition television in Japan, where the government promoted an analogue standard 
neglecting the fact that the worldwide evolution would be toward digital technology (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). 
6 opted for  a single standard,  and 8 for competing standards.  Thus there is  a fairly constant 
fraction of  countries (about 10%) that adopts mUltiple systems. 
(insert Table 1 about here) 
3.2.  The timing and the number of licenses 
Countries  have been quite  heterogeneous  in their decisions  and timing to  issue  first  and 
additional licenses. Table 1 shows that of the 118 countries that adopted an analogue cellular 
system,  88 countries had chosen for a monopoly (of which 83  with a single standard and 5 
with  multiple  systems)  and  30  countries  had  chosen  an  oligopoly.  This  relationship  is 
reversed for the digital technology. Of  the 87 countries, only 39 have a monopoly, whereas 48 
have an oligopoly. This indicates a worldwide trend towards oligopoly with the introduction 
of  the digital technology. 
An explanation for this pattern relates to the differences in capacities during analogue and the 
digital periods. The countries that introduce first licenses early have a strong preference for a 
wide diffusion of  the new technology. Yet during the early years of  the analogue technology 
capacity  was  still  very  much  constrained,  so  that  the  countries  would  gain  little  from 
introducing competition. With the introduction of the digital technology, capacity expanded 
drastically. The early moving countries then had much to gain from introducing competition 
immediately. In contrast, the late-coming countries, with a presumably lower preference for a 
widespread diffusion, had a lower incentive to introduce competition. 
Capacity thus seems to be a first crucial factor in explaining the effects of  competition on the 
diffusion  of mobile  penetration.  When  capacity  is  constrained,  as  under  the  analogue 
technology  (especially  during  the  early  years),  the  effects  of  competition  on  mobile 
; The typical example reported in the literature is the QUERTY keyboard winning over the allegedly superior 
Dvorak keyboard. For a critique ofthe empirical relevance of  network externalities, see Liebowitz and Margolis 
7 penetration are  likely to  be modest.  The  effects of competition are potentially much larger 
under the digital technology when capacity constraints are relaxed. 
In  addition  to  capacity,  consumer  switching  costs  are  a  potential  determinant  of the 
competition effects in the  mobile industry (see e.g.  Valletti and Cave,  1998). For example, 
mobile  operators  frequently  offer  long-term  contracts  to  consumers,  thereby  artificially 
creating lock-in6.  In a one-period context, switching costs (like product differentiation) tend 
to  soften competition between operators.  In a dynamic setting, switching costs may induce 
firms to compete more aggressively for market share during the early phases of competition. 
The presence of switching costs gives rise to some testable predictions. First, switching costs 
can  explain  why  competition  effects  are  stronger  during  the  first  year  than  afterwards. 
Second, switching costs may explain the presence of pre-emptive behavior by an incumbent 
if entry is  sequential. This may be done, for example, through limit pricing (charging lower 
prices  than  a  monopolist  would)  or by following  aggressive  marketing  campaigns.  Limit 
pricing may be explained by a desire to build a strong installed base to exploit market power. 
However,  "limit  overpricing"  may  also  occur,  if it  is  more  important  to  induce  soft 
competition by a future entrant. Limit pricing is more likely if switching costs are present but 
not too large, and if  there is a significant growth of  new consumers7 
( 1999). 
(,  As mentioned before, switching costs are further enhanced when there are multiple systems. Indeed a customer 
who wants to switch to a new supplier of  mobile services using a different system has to invest also into a new 
handset that is compatible with this system. 
7 See Klemperer (1995) for a model of  sequential entry in the presence of  switching costs. Van De WieHe and 
Verboven (1999) compare simultaneous and sequential entry in a model with switching costs. Gruber (1999) 
provides evidence on switching costs by comparing market shares of  mobile operators under simultaneous and 
sequential entry. 
8 4.  The econometric model of diffusion 
4.1.  A logistic model of diffusion 
The evolution of  the market is based on a logistic model of  technology diffusion; see Geroski 
(2000) for  a  recent  overview of the literature on technology diffusion.  Let Yit  denote  the 
number of agents that have adopted the new technology in country i at time t; let Yit*  denote 
the total number of potential adopters. The fraction of the total number of potential adopters 
in country i that have adopted before time t follows the logistic distribution function: 
(1) 
The variable  ait  in  (I) is  a  location or "timing"  variable.  It shifts  the  diffusion  function 
forwards or backwards, without affecting the shape of the function otherwise. For example, 
when ait is very high, we may say that country i at time t is very "advanced" in its adoption 
rate.  The  variable  bit  is  a  measure  of the  diffusion  growth.  This  can  be  verified from 
differentiating (I) with respect to t, and rearranging: 
This implies that bit equals the growth rate in the number of adopters at time t, relative to the 
fraction  of adopters  that  have  not  yet  adopted  at  time t.  Equivalently,  this  says  that  the 
number of new  adopters  at  time  t,  relative  to  the fraction  of adopters  that  have  not  yet 
adopted at time  t,  is  a linear function of the total number of consumers that have already 
adopted at time t. This reflects the epidemic character of  the logistic diffusion model. 
It can be verified that the second derivative of (1) is positive for Yit IYit*<II2, and negative if 
the reverse holds.  The diffusion of the number adopters thus follows  an  S-shaped pattern, 
9 with a maximum diffusion speed reached when half of  the total number of  potential adopters 
has effectively adopted the new technology. 
In our econometric analysis we transform equation (I) as follows: 
( 
Yit  1_ 
log -,-- =  Z;,  = a;,  +b;,t. 
Y;,-Y;, 
(2) 
The  dependent variable,  Zit,  is  the  logarithm  of total  number  of adopters  relative  to  the 
number of potential adopters that have not yet  adopted. We now specify the three essential 
determinants  for  the  diffusion of mobile telecommunication services:  the  total number of 
potential adopters, Yit*; the location variable, ait; and the growth variable bit. 
The total number of  potential adopters, yit*' 
Assume that Yit* evolves proportionally to the total population, POPit: 
(3) 
where 'Yi  is  the proportion of the population in country i that eventually will adopt a mobile 
phone. In principle, Yi  can be estimated as  fixed effects for each country. In practice, this is 
difficult, since most countries are still at the early stages of diffusion. Gruber and Verboven 
(2000) resolved this problem by pooling the data, and estimating a parameter Y,  common for 
all  countries.  This  facilitates  estimation  because  one  can  exploit  information  from  both 
countries in  early and in more mature stages of diffusion. This approach may be justified in 
their study,  which considered the relatively homogeneous  group  of E.D.  countries.  In our 
present  study,  which covers a heterogeneous  set of almost all  countries in  the world,  this 
approach is harder to justify. A more flexible approach would be to allow the parameter Y  to 
differ  across  certain  groups  of  countries,  according  to  various  economic  and  social 
10 determinants,  such  as  income,  the  level  of education  or  urbanisation.  In practice,  this 
approach proved  difficult,  essentially because  within  each  group  only few  countries  had 
reached more mature stages of diffusion.  R 
Dekimpe, Parker and Sarvary (1998) followed an alternative approach. They treat the total 
number of potential adopters as  a "known" parameter. More specifically, based on industry 
interviews,  they specify the  total  number of potential  adopters as:  "the percentage of the 
literate  people living  in  urban  areas having  a  sufficient income  to  afford  basic  telephone 
service". Our approach is  in a similar spirit:  we treat the fractions 'Ii  as  known parameters, 
dependent on urbanization and economic development.9  The empirical results  were robust 
with respect to alternative assumptions. 10 
The location and growth variables ait and bit. 
The location variable ait and the growth variable bit in (2) are specified in a general form as: 
, The problems were oftwo types. First, convergence was often difficult to obtain, since the model is nonlinear 
and the parameter yoften causes the term within the logarithm to become negative. Second, if  convergence was 
reached, the standard errors were quite high, essentially saying the data are at present uninformative about the 
total market potential. 
<)  Another important determinant for diffusion not explicitly included is equipment prices. For instance Garrard 
(1998) reports that the first cellular user terminals (which because of their heavy weight were actually not hand 
held but car-mounted) cost US$ 3000 at the beginning of  the 1980s. Prices declined rapidly, as did weight. Ten 
years later, a handset was already available at US$ 200. While the lightest handset weighted 850 grams in  1985, 
this was reduced to less than 100 gram at the end of  the 1990s. There are relatively few equipment suppliers 
worldwide and price decline of equipment occurred uniformly on a worldwide scale. Price levels may differ 
across countries mainly because of  tax and tariff reasons. The model takes account of  these effects through fixed 
effects and the time trend. 
10  In particular, we experimented with alternative values for y, common across countries. We also allowed y to 
be specific to the income class of  the country, and to depend on the degree of  urbanization. The empirical results 
are robust under these alternative assumptions. Intuitively, this is because most countries are far away from 
reaching full  adoption. The empirical results are based on y=A5, which was the estimate obtained for a restricted 
specification, excluding all variables but the time trend. 
11 bit  = [3,0  +  [31 Di;  + X it[3.  (4) 
(oo:! 
The parameters  a,o  and  [3iO  are country-specific location and growth effects. The variables 
Di;  are  dummy variables to  capture the effect of certain events j. More specifically, let  T/ 
denote  the  time  of a  certain  event j  in  country  i,  e.g.  the  introduction of competition  in 
country i.  The dummy variable  D,;  then equals zero for  t < T/ ' and equals one for  t;:: Ti i . 
The parameters a i  and [3 i  measure the effect of event j on the timing and growth variables; 
they  are  assumed  to  be  the  same  across  countries.  The  vector  Xii  includes  continuous 
variables affecting the location or growth variables, e.g. per capita income. 
Specification (4) allows an event j to have an effect on both the location and growth variable 
in an  unrestricted way.  Most of the empirical literature implicitly imposes structure on  the 
specification by allowing the variable to enter only in the location or in the speed variable. 
We instead propose a more systematic approach. We impose and test the restriction that there 
is no discontinuous jump or fall in the number of adopters after event j takes place; there can 
thus only be a  smooth acceleration or deceleration after event j. More formally, we impose 
the restriction that the adoption level at the time of  introduction of  event j, i.e. at T/ ' is equal 
to the adoption level slightly before the time of introduction ofeventj, i.e. at  T,J -£ (with  £ 
small). Since at T/, Di;  = I, and at  T,i  - £  ,  Dit  = 0, this condition implies that: 
aD +ai +  a k  Dk +X  a+([30 +[3i +  . [3k Dk +x [3\' 
I  It  II  I  It  It  I 
k'l': j  k:t:.i 
which simplifies to: 
12 (5) 
Substituting (4), using restriction (5), into the transformed diffusion equation (2), we obtain: 
J 
zit  = (X;lI  + X;/(X + (I3;lI + xitf3)t +  f3i Ddt -T/). 
j=l 
(6) 
To  test restriction  (5),  one may first  estimate  (6)  after including (l as  in the  unrestricted 
equation, and apply standard t-tests or F-tests on the (joint) significance of the (l. 
4.2.  Empirical specification 
We now specify the model used to analyze the role of  the timing of first and additional entry 
licenses, the effects of  standards regulation, and country characteristics. 
The timing ofjirst entry licenses. 
The policy relevance of the timing of first entry licenses depends on the speed of diffusion 
convergence between early and late-coming countries. If convergence between early and late-
coming countries occurs slowly, then regulatory delay has long persisting consequences and 
the  timing  of first  entry  licenses  becomes  a  very  central  part  of regulatory  policy.  If 
convergence is fast, then the timing of first entry licenses may be of secondary importance to 
policy makers.  The  speed of convergence,  or the  extent  of catching-up,  may depend  on 
various  factors,  such  as  declining  investment  costs  through  calendar  time,  international 
learning spillovers, etc ... 
To  assess the speed of convergence, we analyze the relation between the  fixed effects,  (X;1I 
and  I3;lI. For example, an early country (with a typically high  (X;lI) may have a lower growth 
(13;")  than a late-coming country (with a low  (X;lI). If  this is consistently the case, then there is 
13 catching-up by latecomers,  or international convergence.  One simple way to  incorporate a 
catching-up effect is by imposing the following relationship between lX,o  and  /3;0 : 
(7) 
If Ie  is positive, then there is  a catching-up. In fact,  (7) implies full catching-up or complete 
convergence. To  verify this,  substitute (7) into (6),  to  see that all  countries converge to  the 
same adoption level (holding other variables constant) at time  t = 1  / A . Gruber and Verboven 
(2000) imposed a full catching-up specification in their analysis ofE.V. countries. 
The present study also considers a partial catching-up specification, in which countries still 
converge at  t = 1 / A, except for a fraction a of  the difference in their initial adoption levels. 
Let country i's initial adoption level, at the introduction date t = T;o , be  z;r,"  = lX;o  + /3;0'f;0 . A 
generalization of (7) then is: 
(8) 
Substitute (8) into (6), to verify that countries converge at  t = 1/ A, except for a fraction 0  of 
the difference in the initial adoption level  lX~ + /3;0r,0 . For example, if 0=0 (and A>O),  then 
convergence is complete as under (7); in contrast, if 0=1 (and A>O), then countries converge 
except for the full difference in the initial adoption level. For any 0, (8) still implies that two 
countries with different introduction dates converge at  t = 1  / A , provided they started at the 
same initial adoption level. Thus (8) allows us to focus on the speed of  convergence between 
countries that have different introduction dates and are similar otherwise, while allowing for 
partial or no  convergence between countries that start from different initial adoption levels. 
To  clarify this, Figure 1 plots the (transformed) diffusion curve for three countries when (8) 
holds and 0=1. Country 1 and 2 start at a different introduction date but at  the same level. 
14 They fully converge at  t = 1/ A . Country 1 and 3 have a different adoption date and also start 
at  a  different  level.  They  converge  at  time  t = 1/ A, up  to  the  initially  different  level. 
Countries 2 and 3 stmi at the same date but at a different level; they do not converge. 
The timing of  additional entry licenses. 
The  effects  of additional  entry  licenses  are  taken  into  account  through  several  dummy 
variables  D;;.  We  make  a  distinction  between  introducing  competition  among  analogue 
operators,  and  introducing  competition  between  digital  operators.  Furthermore,  we 
distinguish  between  simultaneous  entry,  where  two  or  more  operators  enter at  once,  and 
sequential  entry,  where  one operator  enjoys a monopoly period before additional entrants 
enter. Finally, we  distinguish between an initial effect of competition on diffusion growth, 
and  the  effect  after  one  year.  The  reasons  for  including  all  these  variables  have  been 
discussed  in  the  previous  section.  We  now  define  the  various  dummy  variables  more 
precisely. 
COMP  _A,  COMP  _D:  dummy  variables  equal  to  1  as  soon  as  competition  between 
analogue or digital operators is introduced 
SIMCOMP  _A,  SIMCOMP  _D:  dummy variables  equal  to  1 as  soon  as  simultaneous 
competition between analogue or digital operators is introduced 
SEQCOMP  _A,  SEQCOMP  _D:  dummy  variable  equal  to  1  as  soon  as  sequential 
competition between analogue or digital operators is introduced. 
For the  sequential  competition variables  we  also  considered  one-period  lags.  These  lags 
measure the effect on the diffusion growth in the year prior to competition. They thus capture 
the possibility of pre-emption by incumbents. For both the sequential and the  simultaneous 
15 competition variables we also considered one-period leads. These variables measure whether 
the effects of  competition occurred mainly in the first year, or also persisted in later years. 
Technological systems and competition between technological systems. 
For each country we know the technological systems that are available: these include NMT, 
TACS, AMPS, C450 and national systems for the analogue technologies, and GSM and non-
GSM systems for the digital technologies. We considered the effect of all these technologies 
separately.  To  simplify  the  exposition,  we  summarize  the  effects  of  the  different 
technological systems through the following variable: 
DIGITAL: dummy variable equal to  1, if  a digital system has been introduced. 
We  also  introduce  variables  to  measure  the  effect  on  the  diffusion  when  different 
technological systems compete with each other: 
COMPSYST_A, COMPSYST_D: dummy variable equal to  1, if there are two or more 
competing  analogue  or  digital  systems.  Since  the  variable  DIGITAL  is  included, 
COMPSYST_D measures the additional effect of competing digital systems relative to 
the independent effect of  the digital technology. 
To  capture  the  effects  on  the  diffusion  when  a  digital  system  is  introduced  without  a 
previously introduced and co-existing analogue system, we introduce the following variable: 
SINGLE_D:  dummy  variable  equal  to  1,  if a  digital  system  is  introduced  without  a 
previously introduced and co-existing analogue system. 
Country characteristics. 
16 We include the following country characteristics in  Xii. 
GDPCAP: income per head, real gross domestic product per capita in U.S. dollars. 
MAlNCAP: the number of fixed mainlines per capita.  This variable captures the size of 
the fixed network, which may be a substitute or a complement for a mobile phone. 
W AlTLIST:  the waiting  list  for  a  fixed  line  connection,  the  ratio  between  registered 
applications  for  a  fixed  line  and  the  number  of connected  fixed  line  subscribers.  It 
captures  the  efficiency  of the  fixed  operator,  as  well  as  the  current "excess" telecom 
demand. 
4.3.  Data description 
The study uses annual data for 140 countries that have adopted cellular telecommunications. 
Apart from the countries that have not adopted cellular telecommunications, 22 mostly very 
small countries are excluded. In total, the sample represents 94% of the world's population. 
The time series starts in 1981 and thus covers all cellular markets from the first year, with the 
exception of Japan where this was introduced in 1979.  The data on the number of analogue 
and digital subscribers, the waiting list and the number of fixed mainlines is from the World 
Teleconununications Indicators of  the lTU (1999). The information about the type of  system 
is  gathered  from  various  sources,  such  as  the  trade  press  (Mobile  Communications  and 
EMC),  GSM  Memorandum  of Understanding  (http:\\www.gsmworld.com).  Beckers  and 
Smits (1997) and Garrard (1998). The macroeconomic data such as GDP and population are 
taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. 
Tables 2 and 3 present some descriptive statistics on the diffusion levels at different point in 
time, and on the included explanatory variables. 
17 5.  Empirical Results 
We  estimated  the  diffusion  model  using  nonlinear  least  squares.  We  could  not  reject 
restriction (5),  which imposes a continuous change after a new event, for any specification. 
We  thus concentrate on the restricted diffusion model (6). Table 4 presents the estimates for 
various alternative specifications. J J 
(insert table 4 about here) 
The  first  colunm shows estimates when country characteristics are  excluded and constraint 
(7) is applied, i.e. ()=o (full international convergence at estimated time t =  11 A ). The second 
column shows estimates when country characteristics, GDPCAP, MAIN  CAP and WAITLIST 
are  also included. The third colunm allows A to vary across groups of countries. The fourth 
column generalizes (7) to the more flexible constraint (8). 
The effect of  country characteristics 
Specifications (ii)-(iv) show that countries with a high income per capita (GDPCAP) tend to 
be  more advanced in adopting mobile phones,  yet the effect is  diminishing over time.  The 
overall  effect  of income  on  mobile  penetration  remains  positive  roughly until  2010  (for 
specification (ii)).  This is  intuitive, given the large  fraction of the budget to be spent on a 
mobile phone during the early years, and the declining prices afterwards. Similarly, countries 
with  a  large  fixed  network  (MAIN  CAP)  tend  to  be more  advanced  in adopting  mobile 
phones.  Yet again the  effect is  diminishing over time and becomes negligible around 2007 
II We considered the robustness of  our empirical results in various respects: (i) impose (7) or its generalization 
(8), or estimate the fixed effects between  a,o  and  /3;0  freely; (ii) include or exclude the country characteristics 
variables; (iii) restrict the market potential to the same proportion for all countries, or allow the proportion to 
vary across countries according to income class and urbanization level. The empirical results remained robust 
with respect to changes in any of these dimensions. 
18 (for  specification  (ii)).  This  suggests  that  the  fixed  network  is  largely  viewed  as  a 
complement to mobile phones.  Finally, countries with a large  waiting list for  a  fixed  line 
connection initially have lower mobile penetration levels.  Yet these countries experience a 
very strong and significantly higher annual growth rate than countries with a low waiting list. 
This  brings  them  to  more  advanced  adoption  levels  from  1987  onwards.  Mobile 
telecommunications  may  thus  be  a  very  suitable  tool  for  providing  telecommunications 
access in inefficient fixed line markets, i.e. more typically developing countries. 
The timing offirst entry licenses 
Let us now consider the relevance of  the timing of  first entry licenses, by looking at how fast 
early and late-coming countries converge. Columns (i) and (ii), which impose restriction (7), 
find a precise estimate of  Ie of  .029 and .027, respectively. Countries that are less advanced in 
the level of adoption thus catch up by growing faster than early countries. Nevertheless the 
catching-up  effect  is  very  slow:  the  date  of convergence  in  adoption  levels  (t = 1  / A) is 
t=34.5 and t=37.0, in the specifications under column (i) and (ii), respectively (with standard 
errors of2.1 and 5.1  respectively. Because t=O  corresponds to the year 1980, this means that 
countries  would  converge  in  2014  and  2019,  respectively  (with  95  percent  confidence 
intervals of 2010-2018  and  2009-2029, respectively). The estimated convergence dates  are 
later than in Gruber and Verb oven (2000), who found convergence around 2008. This is not 
surprising given that the  set of countries is  now much more heterogeneous than the  E.U. 
countries. 
To  incorporate the heterogeneity between countries, we relaxed restriction (7) in two ways. 
First,  we  allowed  Ie  to  vary  across  the  following  four  groups  of level  of economic 
development (according to the World Bank classification): low, lower-middle, upper-middle 
19 and  high-income  countries. 12  The  estimates  III  column  (iii)  show  that  there  are  indeed 
significant differences in catching-up across the four groups of  countries. The least developed 
group  1 and group 2 countries show the slowest convergence (around year 2013), preceded 
by group  3 countries (around 2008)  and group  4 (around 2006).  Even though late-coming 
countries  thus  catch  up  faster  if they  come from  more  developed countries  (group  3 and 
group 4), the delay is still substantial. 
Second,  we  included  the  possibility  of partial  convergence,  using  (8)  instead  of  (7). 
Convergence may now occur except for  a  fraction  ('j of the difference  in  initial  adoption 
levels. This allows us to focus on convergence between countries with different introduction 
dates  that are similar otherwise. (see section 4.2). The results in  column (iv) now show an 
estimate of  Ie equal to 0.046 and an estimate of  ('j equal to .78. According to this specification 
countries converge around 2002, except for 78 percent of  the possible difference in the initial 
adoption level. Referring to Figure I, this means that two countries issuing a first license at a 
different point in time but with the same intiallevel converge around 2002, whereas countries 
with  different  initial  adoption  levels  show  little  convergence.  Intuitively,  the  effects  of 
regulatory  delay  in  issuing  first  licenses  persist  until  2002.13  Any  remaining  lack  of 
convergence  after  that time  follows  from  persisting  initial  differences  in  adoption  levels 
across countries. 
The introduction and timing of  additional ently licenses 
All  specifications  in  Table  4  consider  the  effects  of introducing two  or  more  competing 
operators  during  the  analogue  and  during  the  digital  era.  One  can  see  that  introducing 
12  Instead of assuming that different groups of countries converge at different dates, it would be interesting to let 
the data speak on grouping countries that seem to converge. 
20 competition between operators had a significant impact on the growth of mobile diffusion. 
The  effect  was  especially  large  during  the  digital  era,  and  less  pronounced  during  the 
analogue era.  This is consistent with our hypothesis in section 3 that capacity plays a major 
role in explaining the magnitude of  the competition effects. During the analogue era capacity 
was  constrained, thereby mitigating the positive effects from competition.  Casual evidence 
suggests that prices  indeed remained relatively high after the  introduction of competition 
during the analogue era. 
The discussion in section 3 suggested that in addition to  capacity also consumer switching 
costs  may  influence  the  effects  from  competition.  To  investigate  this,  Table  5  extends 
specification (i)  of Table 4,  to explore the  competition effects in further detail, comparing 
simultaneous with sequential entry, and distinguishing between pre-emptive, immediate and 
future  competition  effects.  The  fust  column  compares  the  effects  of simultaneous  and 
sequential  entry  (SIMCOMP  _A  versus  SEQCOMP  _A,  and  SIMCOMP  _D  versus 
SEQCOMP  _D).  It can be  seen that the impact  on  the  diffusion of mobile  adoption  was 
substantially stronger when entry was  introduced sequentially than when it was introduced 
simultaneously. The sequential entry effect is  especially strong during the digital era when 
capacity is  larger, but it is also present during the more capacity constrained analogue era. 
One  explanation for the  stronger  sequential entry effect is  that the  mobile market is  still 
growing:  since competition is  on  average introduced at a later date under sequential entry, 
some  catching  up  may  be  expected.  An alternative  explanation is  that  a  new  sequential 
entrant  needs  to  price  rather  aggressively  to  obtain  at  least  some  market  share  if the 
incumbent's consumers face significant switching costs. 
(insert table 5 about here) 
13  Some studies indicate high welfare costs from regulatory delays in issuing licences, e.g. Hausman's (1997) 
21 To  further  explore the  role  of switching costs,  we considered pre-emptive, immediate and 
future  competition  effects.  The  second  column  of Table  5  distinguishes  between  the 
competition  effect  during  the  first  full  year  of competition  and the  effect  afterwards,  by 
introducing a lead variable of  the competition variable. Quite interestingly, it can be seen that 
most of the competition effect takes place during the first year. For simultaneous entry during 
the analogue and the digital eras, the competition effects are 0.793 and 0.271  during the first 
year of competition,  and drop to  insignificant numbers  of 0.793-0.855=-0.062  and 0.271-
0.222=0.049  afterwards.  For sequential entry during  the  analogue period, the  competition 
effect is  0.713  during the first year of competition, and drops to an insignificant number of 
0.713-0.703=0.010  afterwards.  Only  for  sequential  entry  during  the  digital  era  the 
competition effect remains large after the first year (0.631-0.026=0.605). Yet this is because 
for this particular case our sample has few years of observations after the second entrant has 
entered. 
The fact  that competition mainly influences the diffusion during the first year is  consistent 
with our hypothesis that consumers have switching costs, as  discussed in section 3. During 
the first year,  fiTI11S  compete vigorously to  build up market share to exploit market power in 
the  future  stages.  Once an installed base is built up,  competition becomes softer.  Note that 
competition does not become so  soft to  actually lower the adoption level or to  reduce the 
adoption growth below the pre-competition rate.  This is because in this market there appear 
new consumers to compete for in every period. 
The third and fourth columns of Table 5 investigate whether, in the case of sequential entry, 
incumbents have an  incentive to pre-empt in the period prior to  actual entry.  This may be 
done,  for  example, through limit pricing  (charging  lower prices than a monopolist)  or by 
estimate that regulatory delay in analogue cellular licenses has costed the US economy 100 billion US$. 
22 following aggressive marketing campaignsl4 While switching costs may explain incumbent's 
limit pricing as a strategy to build up a market share to exploit future market power, it is  not 
the only possibility. In fact, an incumbent may "limit overprice" (charge higher prices than a 
monopolist), if it  is  more important to  induce soft competition by the future  entrant. Limit 
pricing  is  more  likely if switching  costs  are  present but  not too  large,  and if there  is  a 
significant growth of  new consumers. 
To assess the presence of  pre-emptive behavior, we included a lagged dummy variable for the 
sequential entry variables. The third colunm shows that this lagged variable has a significant 
and large effect during both the analogue and the digital eras.  This suggests the presence of 
pre-emptive  behavior  by  incumbent  firms,  through  limit  pricing,  aggressive  marketing 
campaigns or otherwise. To obtain further insights, the fourth colunm constrains the effect of 
the  lagged  (pre-emption)  competition  variable  to  be  the  same  as  the  actual  competition 
variable. This shows more precisely how the diffusion level in the analogue era is increased 
especially during the year preceding competition and the year of  actual competition. 15 
To summarize this analysis, we fmd that competition has a stronger impact during the digital 
era than during the analogue era,  thanks to the drastically increased capacity. We also  find 
that competition especially induces diffusion during the early years (or even in the preceding 
year in the case of sequential entry),  and  that  sequential entry has a stronger impact than 
simultaneous  entry.  This  is  consistent  with  the  presence  of consumer  switching  costs, 
accounting for the fact that there also appear new consumers every period. 
,. A example in this respect is the UK. In spite of a duopoly during the second half of  the I  980s and the early 
years of 1  990, prices for mobile telecommunications stayed constant in nominal terms. Only the sequential entry 
oftwo further finns in 1993 and 1994 respectively induced a pattern of  falling prices (Valletti and Cave, 1998). 
"  The fact that for analogue sequential entry the competition effects are lower in specification (iii) and (iv) as 
compared to specification (ii) does not mean that the results are not robust. This is because (ii) does not take into 
23 The role of  technological systems and systems competition 
Tables 4 and 5 also include an assessment of the effects of different technological systems. 
First,  note  that  the  presence  of  a  digital  technology  (DIGITAL)  has  only  a  modest 
independent impact on the diffusion growth. Quite intuitively, the beneficial capacity impact 
of the  digital  technology works  best in those  cases where it  has  been combined with  the 
introduction of competition (COMP  _D), as  discussed before. Similarly, the introduction of 
the digital technology without a preceding analogue period (SINGLE_D) had no significant 
independent  impact.  This  suggests  the  absence  of a  lock-in effect  into  the  less  efficient 
analogue system. 
Now consider the effects on the diffusion growth when there were two or more competing 
analogue or digital systems, measured by COMPSYST_A COMPSYST_D. Table 4 suggests 
that competition between analogue systems (e.g. NMT and TACS) slowed down the growth 
in mobile diffusion. This is confirmed by large and significant negative annual growth effects 
of about 6-7 percent in the more elaborate specifications of Table 5. 16  Competition between 
digital  systems  (GSM  and  non-GSM)  also  seemed  to  slow  down  diffusion.  While  the 
negative point estimates for the effect of digital systems competition seem quite substantial, 
they are also rather imprecise. This is because there are only few observed cases. 
To  interpret this,  recall that there  may be both advantages and disadvantages from having 
competing systems rather than single standards. The major advantage of allowing competing 
systems is  that markets may not be locked in into  inferior technologies and that finns  are 
motivated to  continuously invest in R&D to  improve the quality of their technology. Major 
disadvantages of allowing competing systems are that network externalities are more limited 
account pre-emptive effects. To properly compare (ii) with (iii) and (iv), one should add the pre-emptive and 
actual effects in specifications (iii) and (iv). One then obtains a similar cumulative effect. 
24 (especially when roaming is valued highly) and that economies of scale in the manufacturing 
of  equipment  are  not  fully  exploited.  Our  empirical  results  thus  indicate  that  the 
disadvantages of competing systems (network effects and scale  economies) were dominant 
during the  analogue  era.  During  the  digital  era,  the  disadvantages  may have  been partly 
balanced by the advantages from technological systems competition. This is consistent with 
the view by Shapiro and Varian (1999), who argue that the decentralized systems competition 
approach followed  in the U.S.  may have hindered diffusion of the  current technology, but 
gave the innovative CDMA technology a chance to develop: CDMA is now the basis for the 
so-called "third generation" mobile telecommunications such as UMTS. 
6.  Conclusions 
This paper has looked at the effects of entry regulation and standard setting on the evolution 
of the  cellular mobile  telecommunications  services  industry,  controlling also  for  a  set  of 
country specific variables.  It is  shown that policy design  of market  structure  has  to  take 
account of the  technological  constraints.  One  can distinguish between an  analogue phase, 
during which the industry was potentially capacity constrained, and a digital phase,  during 
which  these  constraints  were  relaxed.  Government policies  affected  the  evolution of the 
industry in a different way during both phases. 
First, the actual timing at which first entry licenses are issued had a significant impact on the 
diffusion of mobile services. The effects of regulatory delay in issuing first licenses on cross-
country differences in adoption levels are felt until around 2002.  After that time, a lack of 
convergence has to be attributed to persisting initial differences in adoption levels. 
[(,  Even stronger and significant negative effects (between -5 and -14 percent) were obtained in specifications 
that distinguished between the different quality effects of  the NMT, TACS, AMPS and C450 analogue 
technologies. To simplify the exposition, we do not report the results of  these specifications. 
25 Second, the  introduction of second entry licenses (competition) had a significant impact on 
the diffusion of mobile services. The effect is especially strong during the digital phase. This 
is  consistent with the  existence of binding capacity constraints during the  analogue phase, 
compared  to  a  drastically  expanded  capacity  in  the  digital  phase.  This  confirms  the 
expectation that competition speeds up diffusion. 
Third,  the  timing  at  which second licenses  are  introduced turns  out to  be  very relevant. 
Simultaneous entry has a modest (but significant) impact on the diffusion, whereas sequential 
entry  has  a  stronger impact,  especially during the  digital  phase.  Most of the  competition 
effect takes  place during the first  year of competition.  In the  case of sequential  entry,  the 
competition effect also takes place in the year prior to second entry, indicating pre-emptive 
behavior by the  incumbent.  These findings  can be  explained by strategic behavior by the 
operators in the presence of consumer switching costs. 
Finally,  setting technology standards rather than allowing multiple  competing systems is  a 
relevant detenninant of  the evolution of  the industry. We find that a single analogue standard 
helps to develop the market significantly faster  compared to  competing analogue  systems. 
This is  consistent with the  presence  of network effects  and  scale  economies.  Imposing a 
single digital standard (e.g.  the  GSM in the E.D.) also seems to stimulate diffusion, yet the 
effect  is  imprecisely  estimated;  a  longer  time  horizon  is  required  to  assess  whether the 
advantages  from  systems  competition  in  the  digital  era  (e.g.  the  emergence  of the  new 
CDMA system to be used for third generation mobile telecommunications) are outweighed 
by the network and scale advantages from a single standard. 
With respect to  country characteristics we find  that  income per capita and  the  size of the 
fixed network have a positive (but declining effect) on the level of diffusion.  The length of 
the waiting list for the  fixed  network also  has  a positive effect  on the level of diffusion, 
26 suggesting  that  mobile  telecommunications  is  a  suitable  alternative  in  providing 
teleconmmnication  access  inefficient  fixed  line  markets.  One  of  the  broader  policy 
conclusions that can be drawn from this paper is that public policy decisions typically have a 
persistent  effect on  the  evolution of regulated industries.  Therefore the  cost  af regulatory 
failure  can be very high. Firm entry and their timing are  important determinants for market 
evolution and this importance increases as capacity constraints are relaxed. More research is 
necessary to better understand the  determinants of firm behavior in  such industries, by  for 
instance  using market  share  data.  Robust  results  are  becoming increasingly important  for 
providing policy advice; there will be mounting requests for regulating market structure in 
emerging network segments of  the information and communications industry, which by their 
nature tend to be concentrated. 
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29 Tables and figures 
Table  1.  The  policy  matrix:  number  of countries  adopting  different  policies  for 
analogue/digital cellular systems (Status 1997). 
Single system  Multiple systems  Total 
(Standard) 
Monopoly  83/39  510  88/39 
Oligopoly  22/40  818  30148 
Total  105179  13/8  108187 
Note: First/second number refers to the countries adopting analogue/digital cellular systems. 
Source: World Telecommunications Indicators, Mobile Communications and EMC; own calculations. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics - Included variables (1050 observations) 
Average  St. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
DIGITAL  0,284  0,451  0  1 
SINGLE_D  0,066  0,248  0  1 
COMPSYST_A  0,089  0,284  0  1 
SIMCOMP_A  0,061  0,239  0  1 
SEOCOMP_A  0,114  0,318  0  1 
COMPSYST_D  0,014  0,119  0  1 
SIMCOMP_D  0,120  0,325  0  1 
SEOCOMP_D  0,026  0,158  0  1 
GDPCAP  11136  11533  141  47840 
MAINCAP  7148182  19411600  4215  172452000 
WAITLIST  286027  975325  0  10998700 
















Number  Average  St. Dev. 
of  cases 
Min. 
After  first full year of  introduction 
139  0,3  0,6  0,0 
75  0, I  0,3  0,0 
64  0,4  0,9  0,0 
After.fifih .full year of  introduction 
91  1,7  2,3  0,0 
31  0,9  1.7  0,0 
60  2,1  2,5  0,1 
After tenth full year of  introduction 
36  6,2  5,5  0,0 
6  0,7  1,1  0,0 
30  7,3  5,4  0,4 







0,0  0,2 
0,0  0,0 
0,1  0,3 
At the end of  1990 
0,4  0,9 
0,0  0,2 
0,8  1,2 























2,6  4,5  0,0  All countries  140  22,7 
0,4  1,4  0,0  LDC  76  10,0 
MDC  64  5,2  5,4  0,1  22,7 
Note: LDC: Less developed countries (income class I and 2 according to World Bank Classification). MOe: 
More developed countries (income class 3 and 4 according to World Bank Classification). 
31 Table 4.  Empirical results for diQilsion equation (6) 
(i)  (ii)  (iv)  (iv) 
Ie  .029**  (.001)  .027**  (.002)  .030**  (.002)  .046**  (.002) 
Ie}  .000  (.002) 
Ie)  .006**  (.001) 
Ie.  .009**  (.002) 
(J  .776**  (.074) 
~o  .176**  (.017)  .194**  (.033)  .110**  (.026)  .233**  (.030) 
Growth parameters for competition variables 
COMP_A  .059**  (.017)  .039*  (.020)  .032*  (.017)  .037*  (.021) 
COMP_D  .155**  (.041)  .134**  (.045)  .119**  (.043)  .181**  (.045) 
Growth parameters for technology variables 
DIGITAL  .059  (.039)  .067*  (.044)  .086*  (.043)  -.005  (.044) 
SINGLE_D  .055  (.078)  .061  (.085)  .013  (.078)  -.110  (.092) 
COMPSYST_A  -.036  (.024)  -.044*  (.026)  -.046*  (.023)  .002  (.027) 
COMPSYST_D  -.198  (.151)  -.131  (.189)  -.009  (.184)  -.182  (.184) 
Location parameters for country characteristics 
GDPCAP  .143**  (.027)  .142**  (.031)  .101 **  (.022) 
MAINCAP  .747**  (.260)  1.091**  (.347)  .925**  (.197) 
WAITLIST  -.237  (.222)  -.090  (.236)  -.413*  (.198) 
Growth parameters for country characteristics 
GDPCAP  -.005**  (.001)  -.007**  (.002)  -.001  (.001) 
MAINCAP  -.029**  (.012)  -.053**  (.018)  -.026**  (.008) 
WAITLIST  .052**  (.013)  .048**  (.014)  .066**  (.014) 
* Statistically significant at 5 percent level. 
** Statistically significant at 1 percent level. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
32 Table 5.  Simultaneous versus sequential entry effects, and technological systems competition 
(i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv) 
Analogue technology 
SIMCOMP_A  .018  (.023)  .793**  (.267)  .800"  (.266)  .800"  (.266) 
SIMCOMP_A(+I)  -.855"  (.293)  -.860**  (.292)  -.859**  (.292) 
SEQCOMP_A(-I)  .297*  (.166)  .394**  (.06S) 
SEQCOMP_A  .112*'  (.023)  .713**  (.122)  .197  (.309) 
SEQCOMP_A(+I)  -.703*'  (.141)  -.479'*  (.183)  -.377**  (.084) 
COMPSYST_A  -.073*'  (.02S)  -.060**  (.02S)  -.065**  (.026)  -.065*'  (.02S) 
Digital technology 
SIMCOMP_D  .141**  (.041)  .271**  (.066)  .299**  (.067)  .298**  (.066) 
SIMCOMP_D(+l)  -.222*  (.106)  -.231*  (.10S)  -.231*  (.10S) 
SEQCOMP  _D(-I)  .447**  (.188)  .411*'  (.098) 
SEQCOMP_D  .465'*  (.096)  .631**  (.18S)  -.082  (.3S3) 
SEQCOMP  _D(  + I)  -.026  (.024)  -.008  (.02S)  -.013  (.018) 
COMPSYST_D  -.129  (.1S1)  -.083  (.149)  -.088  (.148)  -.091  (.148) 
* Statistically significant at 5 percent level. 
** Statistically significant at I percent level. 
Standard elTors in parentheses. 
33 Figure 1. 
:11  I 
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t 
Country3 
Note:  Figure 1 shows the diffusion for three countries under equation (8), assuming 0'=1. Country 1 and 2 start 
at a different introduction date, but at the same diffusion level. They fully converge at t=II".  Country 1 and 3 
start at a different adoption date  and also at a different diffusion level. They converge at t=I/", except for the 
full  amount of the initially different level (since 0'=1). Country 2 and 3 start at the same date but at a different 
level. They do  not converge (since  0'=1). To depict situations where 0'<1,  the curve for country 3 needs to be 
modified: the endpoint increases until it reaches the endpoint of the other two countries for 0'=0. 
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